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Abstract
We develop a kind of quantum formalism (Hilbert space probabilis-
tic calculus) for measurements performed over cognitive (in particular,
conscious) systems. By using this formalism we could predict averages
of cognitive observables. Reflecting the basic idea of neurophisiolog-
ical and psychological studies on a hierarchic structure of cognitive
processes, we use p-adic hierarchic trees as a mathematical model of
a mental space. We also briefly discuss the general problem of the
choice of adequate mental geometry.
1 Introduction
Since the creation of quantum mechanics, there are continuous discussions on
possible connections between quantum and mental phenomena. During the
last hunderd years, there was presented a huge number of various proposals
and speculations. We shall mention just a few of them.
The philosophic system of Whitehead [1]-[3] was the rst attempt to es-
tablish quantum/mental connection. Whitehead tried to explain a rather
unusual statistical behaviour of quantum systems by speculating that quan-
tum systems are cognitive systems (at least in some generalized sense), see
also Shimony [4]. An extended discussion on quantum/mental connection
was induced by attempts to solve the problem of quantum measurements,
see e.g. [5]-[12]. The most extreme point of view is that physical reality is, in
fact, created by acts of observations. This kind of considerations is especially
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closely related to so called orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics. By this interpretation a wave function provides the complete de-
scription of an individual quantum system. An act of measurement induces
collapse of the wave function. There are various ideas connecting quantum
collapse and "act of thinking", see e.g. Orlov [13] (quantum logic of con-
sciousness); see also Penrose [14], [15]:
"I am speculating that the action of conscious thinking is very much
tied up with the resolving out of alternatives that were previously in linear
superposition."
In fact, Penrose worked in the reductionist approach, see e.g. [16] (and
compare e.g. [17]-[20]): It seems we could not reduce cognitive phenomena
to neural activity. It might be that we could reduce it to activity of quantum
systems. Roughly speaking an act of thinking is reduced to the collapse of
wave function in quantum gravity. Our thinking ability is based on collapses
of superpositions of two mass states.
The idea of quantum-physical reduction for cognitive processes is quite
popular in quantum community. We also mention the investigations of
H. Stapp [21] who used Copenhagen (Heisenberg-potentiality) approach to
quantum mechanics. He also use quantum reductionist approach:"Brain pro-
cesses involve chemical processes and hence must, in principle, be treated
quantum mechanically." We should also mention quantum eld reduction-
ist models, Jibu and Yasue [22], [23] (based on Umezawa [24]), Vitiello et
el. [25]. These quantum eld models look more attractive (al least for me).
At the moment there is no idea how make the great jump from individual
gravitational collapses to global acts of cognition. Quantum eld models are
more useful to provide such a global structure connecting individual quantum
collapses to "global acts of thinking."
However, it seems that reductionism as the general methodology of brain’s
study is less and less popular in cognitive sciences. After the period of large
hopes associated with new possibilities to study neurons rings, there is
strong disillusionment in the possibility of some physical reduction of men-
tal processes. This is one reason for quite strong critical attitude against
quantum models in cognitive sciences. In the extreme form this criticism is
expressed in the following form:"The only common thing between quantum
and mental is that we have no idea how to understand any of these phenom-
ena." Other thing that induces prejudice against quantum-reduction theories
among neurophisiologists is that quantum micro description contains many
parameters that magnitudes are far from magnitudes of corresponding brain’s
parameters (e.g. temperature, time scale and so on). Of course, it may be
that all these parameter-problems are just technical temporary problems.
Nevertheless, there are doubts about the possibility of the direct application
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of quantum physical theory to cognitive phenomena.
Finally, we discuss the holistic approach to cognitive phenomena based on
Bohmian-Hiley-Pilkka¨nen theory of active information. By considering the
pilot wave as a kind of information eld they presented interesting models of
cognitive processes, see [26]-[28], see also author’s work [29]. Consciousness-
information models also were developed in books of M. Lockwood [30], and
J. A. Barrett [31] (who use a many-minds version of many-worlds interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics) and author’s paper [32] devoted to quantum
information reality.
Last few years I try to split, see [33]-[36], the quantum formalism into
two more or less independent parts: 1) really quantum (quanta, Planck con-
stant, discreteness), 2) Hilbert space probabilistic formalism. Careful anal-
ysis, [33]-[36], demonstrated that Hilbert space probabilistic calculus (Born,
Heisenberg, Dirac, see e.g. [37]-[38]) is a purely mathematical formalism that
gives the possibility to work with context depending probabilities, i.e., prob-
abilities depending on complexes of physical conditions (contexts) related to
concrete measurements.
Therefore we could apply the Hilbert space probabilistic formalism, quan-
tum like formalism, not only to the description of statistical micro phenom-
ena, but also to various phenomena outside micro world. One of such possi-
bilities is to apply quantum-like formalism to describe statistical experiments
with cognitive systems. Such an approach has no (at least direct) relation to
reductionist quantum models. We are not interested in statistical behaviour
of micro systems forming a macro system, brain. Therefore this approach
does not induce such a problem as the transition from micro to macro (tem-
perature and so on). We just use Hilbert space probabilistic formalism to
describe cognitive measurements. As in the ordinary quantum formalism,
mental observables are realized as symmetric operators in the Hilbert space
of square integrable functions φ(q) depending on the mental state q of a cogni-
tive system. By using the Hilbert space scalar product we calculate averages
of mental observables. Of course, this cognitive model is the purely statistical
one. It could not provide a description of individual thought-trajectories.
We underline that the main reason for using quantum-like formalism to
describe statistics of measurements over cognitive systems is that cognitive
systems (as well as quantum) are very sensitive to changes of context of an
experiment - complex of physical and mental conditions, compare to Heisen-
berg [38] or Dirac [37].
One of the fundamental problems in foundations of cognitive quantum-
like formalism is the choice of a mathematical model for a mental congura-
tion space on that wave function is dened. We shall discuss this problem
in the details in section 2. We now only remark that the Euclidean physical
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space (in that the physical brain is located) does not look attractive as a
model of mental space. Instead of this conventional model of space, we de-
velop cognitive quantum-like formalism on the space of information strings
that could be performed by chains of hierarchically ordered neurons. Such a
conguration space is geometrically represented by a hierarchic p-adic tree.
In fact, this idea was already discussed in authors’s paper [32] (see also [39]-
[44]). However, in [32] we did not use the standard Hilbert space formalism.
It was used a generalization of quantum probabilistic calculus based on p-adic
probabilities. In the present paper we use the standard Hilbert space formal-
ism on p-adic trees. In fact, the mathematical formalism of p-adic quantum
mechanics is well developed, see Vladimirov, Volovich, Zelenov [45], [46], see
also [47]. We apply this formalism to cognitive phenomena.
In the ordinary quantum mechanics, we could go beyond the statistical
application of quantum formalism. One of the most attractive possibilities
is to use the pilot wave Bohmian formalism. As we have already remarked,
the idea to use Bohmian mechanics in cognitive sciences was already well
discussed (Bohm-Hiley-Pilkka¨nen [26]-[28] and author [29]). It is rather sur-
prising that it seems to be impossible to create a variant of the pilot wave ex-
tension of quantum-like mental formalism presented in this paper. Formally
we can introduce quantum-like mental potential and force. However, there is
no possibility to derive the equation of motion (a kind of Newton equation)
that would describe trajectories of individual mental states (describe "flows
of mind"). In our formalism this is a consequence of the mathematical struc-
ture of the model. However, it may be that there are some deep cognitive
features behind this mathematical result.
We start with some preliminary considerations on the choice of the ge-
ometry of a mental space.
2 Where is consciousness located?
The problem of location (or nonlocality) of consciousness (as well as more
primitive cognitive processes) is widely discussed in philosophic, neurophisi-
ological and psychological literature, see e.g. [48]-[56]. There is large variety
of views starting with such a primary question:
"Does consciousness located in human brain?"
Both philosophic and neurophisiological discussions are, in fact, related
to one xed geometry, namely the Euclidean one.1 It seems that such an
approach was originated (at least in philosophy) by Kant [55]. For him, the
1Of course, neither philosophers nor neurophisiologists and psychologists really under-
stand the role of the choice of geometry in the problem of location of consciousness.
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space was the absolute Euclidean space. He also pointed out that the idea
of space is the primary idea. Nothing could be even imagine without any
relation to space. As space is identied with the Euclidean space, we have
to look for a place of consciousness in this space. It seems that this is the
starting point of the main stream of modern philosophic, neurophisiological
and psychological investigations. However, despite enormous eorts to nd
the place of consciousness (in particular, by trying to reduce consciousness
to dynamics of excited neurons), there are more and more evidences that
consciousness could not be located in physical space. What is wrong? I
think the choice of geometry. I think that the use of the Euclidean geometry
is not adequate to this problem.
In fact, the idea that dierent natural phenomena are in general described
by using dierent geometries is well established in physics, especially general
relativity. Following to Chalmers [56], we consider consciousness as a kind
of natural phenomena. First we must nd an adequate model of a mental
space. Then we get the possibility to describe cognitive (and conscious)
phenomena. Let us imagine that we would like to describe electromagnetic
processes without to use a mathematical model of the electromagnetic eld
distributed on the Euclidean space. It seems to be impossible. 2
We have already mentioned the use of various geometries in general rela-
tivity. However, these models are mainly locally-Euclidean (Euclidean man-
ifolds). The use of such manifolds could not solve the problem of cogni-
tive nonlocality (in particular, nonlocality of psychological functions). One
of possibilities is to proceed in quantum-like way and use noncommutative
mental "coordinates", see B. Hiley [28]. Another possibility is to try to nd
a model of "classical mental conguration space" (probably as the basis of
a quantum-like model). Since [39]-[46], we use purely information model of
mental space, namely the space of all possible information strings that could
be produced by hierarchically ordered chains of neurons. One of the sim-
plest models of such a space is a hierarchic (homogeneous) p-adic tree Zp,
where p is a natural number. It gives the number of branches leaving each
vertex of this tree. We remark that in mathematical models p is typically
a prime number, see [45], [47]. But it is not so important for our cognitive
considerations.
2Sometimes (especially in philosophy) there are used words "explain consciousness". I
do not think that we could "explain" it (in the same way we could not "explain" electro-
magnetic eld). We could only describe and via such a description understand.
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3 Quantum-like formalism for one layer brain
1. Mental configuration space for one-layer brain. We consider the
simplest hierarchic "brain" consisting of just one hierarchic chain of neurons :
N = (n0, n1, ..., nN , ...). In a mathematical model it is convenient to consider
an innite chain. In the simplest model each neuron can perform only one
of two states: αj = 1 (ring) and αj = 0 (not). In more complex models nj
can perform p dierent levels: αj = 0, 1, ..., p− 1 (for example, frequencies of
ring). It is supposed that neurons in this layer are hierarchically ordered:
n0 is the most important (igniting), n1 is less important and so on. The N
is able to produce information strings of the form:
x = (x0, x1, ..., xN , ...), xj = 0, 1, ..., p− 1.
We denote the set of all such strings by the symbol Zp. The hierarchic struc-
ture in the chain N induces a tree representation of Zp. Information strings
























Figure 1: The 2-adic tree
The distance between two branches, x and y, is dened in the following way.











There exists a natural algebraic structure on this tree: addition, sub-
traction and multiplication of branches. It is based on the representation of
information strings by so called p-adic numbers:
x = x0 + x1p+ ... + xNp
N + ...
This is the ring of p-adic integers. In particular, this is compact additive
group. Thus there exists the Haar measure dx (an analogue of the ordinary
linear measure on the straight line).
We set Br(a) = fx 2 Zp : ρp(x, a)  rg and Sr(a) = fx 2 Zp : ρp(x, a) =
rg, where r = 1/pj, j = 0, 1, 2, ... and a 2 Zp. These are, respectively, balls
and spheres in the metric space Zp. In particular, Zp = B1(0). Each ball has
the structure of the homogeneous p-adic tree (scaling of the basic tree given
by Zp).
2. Hilbert space probabilistic formalism for mental observables.
We choose the space Q = Zp as a mental conguration space. Points
q 2 Q are called mental classical-like states (or simply mental states) or
mental positions.
We consider the space of square integrable functions L2(Zp, dx) :
φ : Zp ! C, kφk2 = ∫Zp jφ(x)j2dx <1.
The space H = L2(Q, dx) is chosen as the space of mental quantum-like
states. These states are represented by normalized vectors φ 2 H : kφk = 1.




φ(x) ψ(x)dx . (1)
Mental observables are realized as self-adjoint operators A : H ! H. As in
the ordinary quantum formalism, by xing a quantum-like state φ 2 H in
general we do not x the concrete value A = λ of a mental observable A. It




A(φ)(x) φ(x) dx . (2)
However, if φ 2 H is an eigenfunction of A corresponding to the eigenvalue
λ, i.e., Aφ = λφ, then we can be sure that we shall obtain the value A = λ
with probability 1.
The concrete representations of mental observables by self-adjoint oper-
ators is very important and nontrivial problem. This problem could not be
solved by trivial generalization of ordinary quantum formalism. We start
with the surprising remark: it seems to be impossible to dene mental posi-
tion, q, observable. Formally the diculty is purely mathematical: we could
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not multiply a p-adic number q 2 Q with a complex number φ(q). There-
fore the standard Shro¨dinger’s denition of the position operator could not
be generalized to the cognitive case. Of course, we could try to nd some
mathematical tricky ("non natural") denitions of mental position operator.
However, it might be that this mathematical diculty is an evidence of some
important feature of cognitive systems. It might be that
even in principle it is impossible to measure mental states Q of brain.
In particular, we could not prepare brain in the xed mental state (there
are no mental state eigenfunctions).
We can only nd the probability that mental state q belong to some
(measurable) subset O of the mental space Q :
P (q 2 O) = ∫O jφ(x)j2dx.
Example 1. Let us consider the quantum like state φ  1 (the uniform
probability distribution of mental states). Then P (q 2 Br(a)) = r. Thus
(as it could be expected) the probability to nd this cognitive system in the
mental state q belonging to a small ball around any xed point a is small.
4 Motivation observable
1. Multi-layers hierarchic brain. To consider nontrivial examples of
mental observables, it is convenient to study a "brain" having more complex
mental space. Such a brain consists of a few hierarchic p-adic trees. We
consider a layer of neurons N = (..., nk, ..., n0, ..., nl, ...) that goes in both
directions (in the mathematical model it is innite in both directions). Each
neuron nj, j = 0,1,2, ..., can be the igniting neuron for right hand side
hierarchic chain: Nj = (nj , ...., nl, ...). The corresponding mental space Z(j)
consists of all information strings
x = (xj , xj+1, ..., xl, ...), xl = 0, 1, ..., p− 1
(in particular, Zp = Z
(0)). Each space has the structure of the homoge-
neous p-adic tree. These spaces are ordered by inclution: Z(j+1)  Z(j). We
consider union of all these space Qp = [1j=−1Z(j). Geometrically this space
is represented as a huge collection of trees ordered by the inclusion relation.
On this space we can introduce the structure of ring: addition, subtraction
and multiplication of branches of trees. If the coding parameter p is a prime
number (i.e., p = 2, 5, 7, ..., 1997, 1999, ...), then Qp is a eld, i.e., division
of branches also is well dened. In this case Qp is a number eld (of p-adic






i, j = 0,1,2, ... (3)
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Metric on Qp is dened in the same way as on Zp. In particular, each tree
Z(j) coincides with a p-adic ball Br(0), where r = 1/p
j. We shall also use
p-adic absolute value:
jxjp = ρp(x, 0). 3
This is locally compact eld and there also exists the Haar measure dx.
We now choose Q = Qp as a model of a mental conguration space;
consider the Hilbert H = L2(Q, dx) of square integrable functions φ : Q! C
as the space of quantum-like mental states.
2. Motivation magnitude observable. It would be interesting to con-
sider the following quantity (more precisely, qualia): motivation ξ to change
the mental state q. Unfortunately, by the same reasons as for the mental state
observable we could not introduce a motivation observable. However, we can
introduce an observable Mξ that will give the magnitude of a motivation. It
is impossible to prepare a brain with the xed motivation ξ, but we could
prepare a brain with the xed amplitude of a motivation (that gives a mea-
sure of motivation’s strength). Such Mξ must be a kind of derivative with
respect to the mental state (coordinate) q. Such a generalization of deriva-





Q φ(x)e(ξx)dx, ξ 2 Q,
where e is a p-adic character (an analogue of exponent).




We remark that DαDβ = Dα+β.
We dene the motivation magnitude observable M as
Mξ = hD
Here h = 1
pm
is some normalization constant. The h plays the role of
the Planck constant in ordinary quantum mechanics. At the moment it
is not clear:"Can we expect that there exists a kind of universal constant
h, the mental Planck constant?" I am quite sceptical that such a universal
normalization constant really exists. It is more natural to suppose that h
would depend on a class of cognitive systems under consideration. In fact,
by nding h (the level of motivation discretization) we nd the basis p of the
coding system.
To calculate averages of the momentum magnitude operator M for dif-
ferent quantum-like mental states, it is natural to use the Fourier transform.
3We have to nd in the chain N the rst (from the left hand side) ring neuron nj
(xj 6= 0, but xl = 0 for all l < j) and set jxjp = 1/pj.
4We remark that it is impossible to dene the derivative for maps from Qp to R, see
[47].
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By analogy with ordinary quantum mechanics we could say: to move from
position to momentum representation. Such a terminology is only formal
in the mental theory. As we have already discussed, there are no mental
position and momentum observables.
Example 2. Let a quantum-like state φ is such that its Fourier transform
~φ(ξ) is uniformly distributed over the ball Br(0), r = 1/p
l. Here







It is important to remark from the beginning that (in the opposite to
the ordinary quantum momentum) the Mξ is nonlocal operator. It can be









To nd Mξ(φ)(x) in some xed point x, we have to take into account values
of φ in all points of the mental conguration space.
We remark that Vladimirov’s operator D has a system of (generalized)
eigenfunctions that is similar to the system of free-wave eigenfunctions in
ordinary quantum mechanics, where φξ(x) = e
iξx/h corresponds to the xed
value ξ of momentum. In the mental framework:
Mξe(hξx) = jξjpe(hξx).
Here we have used the fact [45]: De(ξx) = jξjpe(ξx). We remark that in
the ordinary quantum formalism the h is placed in denominator, ξx/h, and
in the p-adic quantum formalism it is placed in the nominator, hξx. This is
a consequence of the fact that 1/h is large in R and h is large in Qp.
The function φξ(x) = e(hξx) is a kind of free mental wave corresponding
to the xed value ξ of the motivation. As jφξ(x)j = 1 for all x 2 Q, the
probability to nd a cognitive system in the mental state x does not depend
on x. By analogy with the ordinary quantum mechanics we would like to in-
terpret this mathematical fact in the following way: By xing the magnitude
of motivation (strength of willing) we could not localize the mental state.
However, we see soon that such an analogy (between material and mental
states) could not be used.
The wave φξ(x) is not determined uniquely by the observable Mξ. The
main distinguishing feature of p-adic quantum mechanics (discovered by
Vladimirov, [45]) is huge degeneration of spectrum of the momentum and en-
ergy operators. In particular, beside eigenfunctions φξ(x), the Mξ has an in-
nite set of other eigenfunctions corresponding to the eigenvalue λ = jξjp(= pk
for some k = 0,1,2, ...).
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Each λ = pk, k = 0,1,2, ... corresponds to an innite series of eigen-
functions (distinct from the free mental wave φξ(x)) belonging to L2(Q, dx).
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These eigenfunctions are well localized (concentrated in balls) in the mental
conguration space.
This is very natural from the mental point of view. It would be quite
strange if the only quantum-like mental state with the xed motivation mag-
nitude is the state φξ characterized by totally indenite distribution of mental
states q. By intuitive reasons there must be quantum-like mental states char-
acterized by the xed Mξ = λ that are concentrated on a special class of
mental states (a kind of special mental activity).
One of the most important distinguishing features of quantum-like mental
theory is that the motivation magnitude operator Mξ has discrete spectrum
(except to one point, see later). Hence the magnitude of the motivation could
not change continuously.
There exists only one point of spectrum of the operator Mξ that is not
its eigenvalue: λ = 0. It is the limit point of the eigenvalues λk = p
k, k !1.
There is no eigenfunction φ0 belonging to the state space H. Thus in our
model brain could not be (alive, awake?) in the stationary quantum-like
mental state having the motivation of zero magnitude.
Another distinguishing feature is innite degeneration of spectrum. This
purely mathematical result can have important implications for the problem
of correspondence between mental and physical worlds. In fact, due to this
huge degeneration, we could not uniquely determine the mental state of a
cognitive system by xing a motivation.
5 Neuron-activation observable
As we have already discussed, we could not introduce a mental state observ-
able q. However, in the same way as for the motivation we can introduce an
operator of the p-adic magnitude of a mental state:
Mqφ(x) = jqjpφ(x).
Spectral properties of this operator are similar to spectral properties of the
operator Mξ : discreteness and innite degeneration of spectrum. Eigenfunc-
tions of Mq (belonging to H = L2(q, dx)) are localized in p-adic balls{trees.
Therefore:
there exist stationary states of Mq that are characterized by activation of
the xed tree of mental states.
5We remark that free mental waves φξ(x) are so called generalized eigenfunctions. They
are not square integrable. Thus they do not belong to the space of quantum-like mental
states H = L2(Q, dx).
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Unfortunately, Mq could not be used to x such a tree (as a consequence
of innite degeneration of spectrum).
The operators of position and motivation magnitudes, Mξ and Mq, do
not commute (as operators of position and momentum in ordinary quantum
mechanics):
[Mq,Mξ] = MqMξ −MξMq = hJ,
where J 6= 0 is an integral operator [45]. Thus we get a mental uncertainty
relation, compare to [32]:
For any quantum-like mental state φ, it is impossible to measure motiva-
tion and position magnitudes with an arbitrary precision.
By measuring the motivation magnitudes we change position magnitudes
and vice versa.
This can also be expressed mathematically by using the p-adic Fourier
transform. We denote by Ωr(x) the characteristic function of the ball Br(0)







If the state of mind is concentrated on the ball-tree Br(0), then motiva-
tions are concentrated on the ball-tree B 1
r
(0).
As in the case of the Mξ-observable, the point λ = 0 belongs to non
discrete spectrum of theMq observable. Thus there is no stationary quantum-
like mental state φ corresponding to zero magnitude of q. A cognitive system
is not alive (awake?) in such a state.
To understand better the mental meaning of the Mq-observable, it is
useful to consider a new mental observable:
A = − logpMq.
If, φ 2 H is an eigenstate of the Mq corresponding to the eigenvalue λ =
jqjp = 1pk , then φ also is an eigenstate of A corresponding to the eigenvalue
µ = k and vice versa. Thus the discrete part of the A-spectrum coincides
with the set of integers Z. The A gives the position of the igniting neuron in a
layer of neurons. It is called neuron-activation observable. We note that there
is an interesting relation between neuron-activation observable and entropy.
Let us consider the quantum-like state φ(q) =
√
(p+ 1)jqjpΩ1(q). Herep
p+ 1 is just the normalization constant. The corresponding probability
distribution P(q) = (p+ 1)jqjp on the tree Zp and equals to zero outside this




logp P(q)P(q)dq =< A >φ − logp(p+ 1).
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6 Complex cognitive systems; evolution
We now consider a cognitive system consisting of n hierarchic layers of neu-
rons. It can be an individual brain as well as a system of brains. Mental
space of this cognitive system is Q = Qp  Qp (n times). For each mental
coordinate qj , j = 1, 2, ..., n, we introduce the motivation magnitude operator
Mj = hDj , where Dj is Vladimirov’s operator for qj .
We introduce kinetic mental energy (free energy of motivations) as




j is Vladimirovian (a p-adic analogue of the
Laplacian).
We note that free mental waves φξ(x) = e(hξx) are eigenfunctions of
this operator with eigenvalues λ = jξj2p. As in the cases of the Mq, Mξ-
observables, there is an innite family of other eigenfunctions distinct from
free mental waves. These functions are localized on the mental conguration
space (describing xed ranges of ideas). Spectrum is discrete : λ = pk, k =
0,1,2. Thus the kinetic mental energy is changed only by jumps. The
λ = 0 is the only point that belongs to the non discrete spectrum of the
operator of the kinetic mental energy.
Interactions between brain’s layers as well as interactions with the exter-
nal world are described by the operator of the potential mental energy. It
is given by a real valued function (potential) V (q1, ..., qn). The total mental
energy is represented by the operator:
H = h2 + V.
We note that a mental potential V (q1, ..., qn) can change crucially spectral
properties of the mental energy observable. If V depends only on p-adic mag-
nitudes jqjjp of mental coordinates and V !1, jqjjp !1, and V is bounded
from below (e.g. nonnegative), then spectrum of H (that is discrete) has only
nite degeneration. Thus the "state of mind" of a free cognitive system could
not be determined by xing the mental energy. However, by using additional
mental (information) potentials we could (at least in principle) do this.
The ground mental energy state λ0 is not degenerated at all. In the
latter case by xing the minimal value of the mental energy H = λ0 we can
determine the "state of mind", namely the λ0-eigenstate. Even for other
eigenvalues we can try to determine the "state of mind" if the degeneration
of spectrum is not so large. It is interesting to remark that mathematical
results [45] imply that degeneration of eigenvalues (distinct from the ground
energy) increases (as p2) with increasing of p. If we connect the complexity of
a cognitive system with the coding base p, then we obtain that, for complex
cognitive systems (e.g. p = 1999), it is practically impossible to determine
the "state of mind" corresponding to the xed value of mental energy.
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7 State-evolution
We want to describe the evolution of a quantum-like mental state (mental
wave function) φ(t, x). The rst natural and rather nontrivial problem is
the choice of the evolution parameter t. This problem was discussed in the
details in [32]. It was shown that there are dierent natural possibilities to
describe the evolution of mental states: "mental time", "psychological time"
as well as ordinary physical time evolution. In this paper we consider the
evolution with respect to physical time t belonging to the real line R. To
derive the evolutional equation for φ(t, x), we proceed in the same way as
Schro¨dinger in ordinary quantum mechanics. We start with a free mental
wave φξ(x) = e(hξx), ξ, x 2 Qp. We have:
H0φξ(x) = jξj2pφξ(x), where H0 = h2D2 is the operator of the mental
energy for a free system.
The φξ(x) is a stationary state corresponding to mental energy E = jξj2p.
Such a wave evolves as
φξ(t, x) = e
iEt
h φξ(x).
We note that this function is a combination of two essentially dierent
exponents: ordinary exponent and p-adic character. This function satises




(t, x) = h2D2φ(t, x). (4)
This is Schro¨dinger’s mental equation for a free cognitive system. If we





(t, x) = h2D2φ(t, x) + V (x)φ(t, x). (5)
If the initial quantum-like state ψ(x) = φ(0, x) is known, then by using (5)
we can nd φ(t, x) at each instant t of physical time. Under quite general
conditions [45], the operator H = h2D2 + V (x) is a self-adjoint operator.
Therefore (5) is standard Schro¨dinger’s equation in the Hilbert space H for
one rather special class of operators H. There also are mathematical results
on analytical properties of solutions and correctness of Cauchy problem [47].





D2R,where R(t, x) = jφ(t, x)j. (6)
6As we consider the one dimensional case, one layer brain, V (x) describes the influence
of the external world and the interaction between neurons in this layer. In multidimen-
sional case V (x1, ..., xn) also describes interaction between distinct layers.
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However, we could not dene evolution of an individual mental state (posi-
tion): q(t). Nevertheless, Vq−l(x) can be considered as a quantative measure
of mentality. In principle, if we nd a quantum like state φ(t, x), then we can
estimate the "level of mentality" of cognitive systems under consideration by
calculating Vq−l(x). We underline the following properties of Vq−l(x) : 1) It
does not depend on the absolute magnitude of φ; 2) It depends on the sec-
ond variation of the magnitude of φ. Thus systems with slowly variable (in
particular, constant) φ(x) have low level of mentality; systems with quickly
variable φ(x) have high level of mentality (in this state φ). We remark that in
this approach there are no "jumps in mentality level". Computers, insects,
animals, human beings have levels of mentality corresponding to shapes of
φ(x). In principle, if computer could approach high magnitudes of Vq−l(x), it
becomes conscious...
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